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The cooperative versus non-cooperative management of the South African west 
coast hake stock is explored using game theoretic modelling in conjunction with an 
age-structured model. The age-structured model is used to produce a physical flow 
account for input into national resource accounts. Between 1989 and 1998, the 
average catch of hake on the west coast was 92000 tons, most of which was 
harvested by the demersal trawl sector. The physical flow account indicates that the 
conservative re-building management strategy pursued for the fishery over the 
same time period mentioned above, has resulted in a 29% increase in the demersal 
trawl catch over the last decade.  
We simulated the effects of alternative quota restrictions on two fishing 
sectors (the established demersal trawl fleet and the new longline sector) that 
compete for the rights to fish the stock. The results from the bio-economic analysis 
(which forms a basis for a monetary flow account as we calculate the Net Present 
Value of the stock) indicate that the greatest rent can be obtained by allocating a 
share of the total allowable catch (TAC) to longliners. This share that achieves the 
greatest benefits approximates the current TAC allocations to each sector under the 
present conservative management policy implemented by the management 
authority, assuming  one takes into account the uncertainties inherit in a 
computational exercise like ours. This outcome implies that the current management 
initiatives by the government are such that they meet the objectives of the new 
Marine Living Resources Act. That is, the need to achieve optimal utilisation of 
resources is being adequately implemented.  
The results of the game theoretic analysis provide an indication of why the 
current introduction of longlining may affect the government-industry cooperative 
management arrangements. A difference of R50 million will accrue to longliners  
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 over the next thirty years if they engage in non-cooperative rather than cooperative 
strategies. The latter  occurs under the assumption that the trawl sector reduces 
effort under a cooperative strategy. The results indicate that management policies, 
which ignore economic realities, could fail. However, a cooperative strategy is still a 
viable option for the trawl sector, because a difference of R1357 million can be 
obtained over the same time period if the trawl sector  engages in cooperative 
behaviour.  
These results are based on the assumption that benefits accrue to the quota holders 
under security of tenure allowing them to consider the long-term sustainability of 
the resource. Some form of security of tenure is still uncertain under the 
government’s re-structuring program, although a number of new policies are now in 
place to help implement longer term rights. These policy initiatives should create a 
positive environment for all the stakeholders such that they can consider the long-
term sustainable utilisation of the resource. Otherwise, rent will be forgone if the 
rules governing participation (i.e., rights) and the allocation of benefits for shared 
stocks are not well defined and constrained. 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
1.1  Natural resource accounting and South African fisheries 
The new Marine Living Resources Act (1998) has sustainable fisheries management as its 
first objective.  Policy reforms are also underway to re-structure the industry in order to  
address the inequities of the past.  The Act focuses on maximum utilization of marine 
resources for the benefit of all South Africans while also increasing foreign earnings.  The 
development costs of this policy still have to be assessed along with both economic and 
social benefits.  The construction of a set of Natural Resource Accounts (NRA) would 
represent a necessary step towards assessing whether the current resource utilization is 
sustainable under the new policy initiatives in South Africa. 
South Africa’s coastline is over 3 000km long and the nation has an Exclusive Economic 
Zone (EEZ) of approximately 1 million km
2 which contains a variety of fish species.  The 
fishing industry is complex in terms of fishing sectors, processing capability, markets, 
capital investment, equipment and infrastructure.  South Africa is a medium-sized fishing 
nation on global standards, landing between half a million and one million tons of fish 
annually from 1975 to 1991 (SFRI 1993).  This catch generates foreign exchange and 
provides employment.  At the national level the fishing industry comprises 0.5 per cent of 
the US$136.2 billion GDP1.  However in the Western Cape, where the majority of fishing 
occurs, the industry represents 1.5 per cent of the local economy and employs more than 
25 000 people.  In 1994 the harvest for the entire South African fishing industry had an 
                                                 
1 The Economist, 2000. 
 
No 1, 2002    
 
2
estimated annual wholesale value of US$390 million, to which the demersal and mid-water 
trawl contribute just over 50 per cent (Table 1, Stuttaford 1996).  The bulk of the South 
African demersal catch comprise of Cape hakes (for example 62 per cent in 1991, Stuttaford 
1993).  Thus the two species of Cape hakes form the basis of the most important fishery in 
the country and therefore the subject of our study. 
Table 1  The catches and economic value of South Africa’s commercial fisheries 




Nominal Catch (t) 
Wholesale Value – processed 
US$ millions 
Demersal and Midwater trawl*  188 842  201 
Pelagic  315 545  81 
Rock lobster  3 190  47 
Linefisheries     
Tuna  4 069  6 
Squid-jigging  6 442  19 
Handline fishery  12 878  21 
Abalone  613  15 
TOTAL  531579  390 
*Includes hake - the main species targeted which is reviewed in this case study. 
There is a need to quantify the natural capital of fish stocks in economic terms 
and to consider South Africa’s options for long term investment in natural capital versus 
stock depletion and ecosystem degradation.  This can be assessed by calculating the net 
present value of future income streams under alternative harvesting methods and 
management policies.  The potential outcomes of alternative policy options are particularly 
important to managers because the opportunity costs of providing fishers with alternative 
means of employment are often high. 
Of particular interest is the application of bio-economic models to evaluate 
tradeoffs between alternative fishing methods using game theoretic methodology (see for  
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example Sumaila 1997).  The fisheries along with alternative harvesting methods must be 
included in an assessment of South Africa’s marine living resources.  The Resource 
Accounting Network for Eastern and Southern Africa (RANESA) is a regional network 
tasked with enhancing capacity in the development and use of NRAs in Southern Africa.   
Our aim was to carry out an analyses that would provide a crucial input for a NRA for the 
South African economy, namely an assessment of the value of South Africa’s fishery 
resources.  In a review of the application of NRA to various countries, Leefers and Castillo 
(1998) do not list any cases where fisheries are studied.  Thus there is a need to include 
South African fisheries within a NRA. 
Various methods  have been proposed and applied for the integration of 
environmental concerns into economic indices (see Gilbert and Hafkamp 1986, El Serafy 
and Lutz 1989, Repetto et al. 1989, Hull 1993, Moffat 1995, Alfsen 1996, Bartelmus 1996, 
Daly 1996, Lai 1997, Nordhaus and Kokkelenberg 1999).  Prudham and Lonergan (1993) 
provide a summary of the various techniques although there is a need for a more recent 
review. Natural resource accounting has also been applied to Southern African resources, 
for example, Crowards (1996) considered woodlands, soils and minerals in Zimbabwe. One 
method is to follow the United Nation’s SEEA (System of Integrated Environmental and 
Economic Accounts)(United Nations, 1993) which emphasizes the compilation of physical 
and monetary accounts.  Bloem and Weisman (1996) provide a critique of the SEEA 
approach.  Lange (1998), in another example of a NRA assessment of resources in Southern 
Africa, used the SEEA methodology to consider the incorporation of Namibia’s water 
resources in the national accounts.  
Both the physical and monetary accounts rely on the compilation of stock and 
use accounts constructed for a benchmark year and all other years for which data are 
available.   Economic data also needs to be collected to calculate the economic 
contribution of fish harvests to different sectors of the economy.  Our goal is to analyse 
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current harvest levels and policy using flow accounts of NRA.  The natural capital of hake 
stocks, which contribute the greatest value to the wealth generated from the nations fish 
stocks, have to be quantified in economic terms and future options for long term 
investment in this capital have to be considered.  The concept of managing fish stocks in a 
similar way as managing human-made capital is well established (see Munro 1992, Clark 
and Munro 1994).  The alternative of negative investment due to poor management would 
result in depleted fish stocks and degradation of marine ecosystems.  Depleted stocks 
would have negative effects on a country as a whole because a decrease in the net 
aggregate investment will result in a decrease in social welfare (Dasgupta and Mäler 1999).  
Thus it is essential that the net aggregate investment be quantified for natural capital such 
as a fish stocks. 
The benefits of management can only be assessed by calculating the net present 
value of future income streams under alternative harvesting methods (trawl versus longline 
for the hake stock) and management policies.  Thus the potential rent from the hake fishery 
under different configurations of trawl/longline catch levels must be calculated, providing 
vital input to future studies on rent capture and its distribution among different 
stakeholders.  This will allow the management authorities to consider realistic policy 
alternatives that can then be evaluated in a multi-sectoral framework.  Such a framework 
would take into account the full range of development objectives and the sectoral 
strategies for achieving alternative objectives.  This would form the basis of an input of 
fisheries into a NRA.  The NRA can then be linked to national accounts through the use of 
the same classification of economic activities as was undertaken by Lange (1998) for 
Namibia’s water resources.  The case study in this project will construct the physical and 
monetary accounts for the west coast deepwater hake fishery providing a model for future 
fisheries assessments in the region. 
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1.2  Aim of study 
The aim of this study is firstly to undertake a bio-economic assessment of Cape hake on 
the west coast of South Africa and secondly to analyze potential outcomes under 
alternative management arrangements.  Numerous requests have been made for the 
redistribution of quotas in South Africa in order to redress the imbalances of the past.  The 
re-distribution of quota to newcomers and previously disadvantaged South Africans is 
occurring with the creation of new players, rather than via the elimination of existing quota 
holders.  It is worth noting that up until now a bio-economic assessment, which considers 
both sectors (the demersal trawl and longline sector), has not been undertaken for this 
fishery.  The research is important in that it will add a scientific perspective to the ongoing 
debate over the restructuring of the industry.  Although the hake fishery has traditionally 
been a trawl-based fishery, the question that needs to be asked is whether the longline 
fishery will have positive or negative effects on the traditional fishery.  More importantly, 
the question needs to be asked whether the longline fishery will provide greater economic 
benefits to the country.  The specific questions addressed include (i) what are the short-
term economic losses to the trawl fleet of an increase in the longline fleet, (ii) what mix of 
trawlers and longliners provides the greatest catch, and m ore importantly (iii) what mix 
provides the greatest economic benefits? 
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2.  BACKGROUND:  THE MANAGEMENT OF CAPE HAKES 
The Cape hake or Stockfish (a popular name for hake in South Africa) is an important 
commercial demersal fish species.  Its distribution e xtends along the entire western 
seaboard of South Africa from Cape Point to north of the border where it is also fished in 
Namibia.  Hake are also found on the south-east coast on the Agulhas Bank.  The Cape 
hake fishery is of considerable social and economic value to South Africa.  Annual hake 
catches by the South African fishing fleet over the period 1982-1991 remained fairly 
constant, averaging 138 000 tons per year.  Payne (1989) provides a detailed history of the 
hake fishery off southern Africa. 
Reviews of the biology of this resource are provided by Botha (1980), Crawford et 
al. (1987), Payne (1989) and Payne and Punt (1992).  Cape hakes consist of two 
morphologically similar hake species, Merluccius capensis and M. paradoxus  (Van Eck 
1969).  Since it is not easy to distinguish visually between the two species only the total 
combined species catch is recorded.  The distribution of each species is depth-dependent; 
M. paradoxus occurs in deep water while M. capensis is a shallow water species (Botha 
1973) (Figure 1).  The distribution areas of the two species overlap in intermediate waters 
where small M. paradoxus occur together with medium to large M. capensis individuals as 
the size of fish of each species tends to increase with depth (Botha 1973).  Consequently 
the adults of the two species do not mix and the species maintain their integrity by 
spawning at different depths (Botha 1973).  
 
Figure 1 The distribution of  Merluccius capensis  (Shallow-water Cape Hake) and M. 
paradoxus (Deep-water Cape Hake) off the coast of South Africa and Namibia. 
The ICSEAF divisions are also shown.  
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Earlier workers (for example Roux 1949) were convinced that there was some form 
of horizontal annual hake migration, but such conclusions were drawn on the erroneous 
premise that only one species existed.  Van Eck (1969) later confirmed the presence of two 
hake species in local waters.  There is a tendency for hake to move offshore into deeper 
water as they grow older and there appears to be some seasonal movement of adults 
inshore and offshore (Payne  et al. 1989), but apart from that, there is no firm proof of 
extensive horizontal migration (Botha 1973, 1980).  
 
2.1  Management of the fishery 
Since the turn of the century Cape hakes have formed the basis of a substantial local trawl 
fishery.  This fishery was initially based in Cape Town, but later (in the 1960s) became 
established at Saldanha.  Only a thousand metric tons was caught in 1919, but catches 
steadily increased to 30 000 metric tons before the Second World War (Figure 2).  Later 
catches of Cape hakes in the southern Benguela increased from 50 000 tons in 1950 to 
about 160 000 tons in 1960 (Crawford et al. 1987)(Figure 2).  After 1962 Cape hakes also 
became a sought-after target for foreign trawlers from several countries.  By 1972 the 
maximum catch of just over 1.1 million tons was reached (Payne 1989).  The increasing 
fishing effort made a substantial impact on stock densities and catch rates decreased by 47 
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per cent between 1940 and 1966 and a further 50 per cent between 1966 and 1975 (Jones 
and Van Eck 1967). 
 

























The local fishery has traditionally confined its activities to the fishing grounds 
around Cape Town and to a lesser extent off the southern coast of South Africa.  Foreign 
vessels concentrated in areas further north, off the coast of Namibia.  The International 
Commission for the Southeast Atlantic Fisheries (ICSEAF) was established in 1972 to 
investigate and control the international fisheries for hake off South Africa and Namibia 
(Andrew and Butterworth 1987).  Since 1978 total allowable catches (TACs) off South 
Africa were set to rebuild the stock, by applying an f0.1 or an f0.2 harvesting strategy.  The 
fishery off South Africa has been managed exclusively by the nation since the declaration 
of a 200 nautical mile exclusive fishing zone in 1977.  However the ICSEAF Scientific 
Advisory Council continued to consider assessments for the hake stocks in South African 
waters, and to allocate quotas for hake off Namibia until ICSEAF was dissolved in 1990 
following the independence of Namibia. More recently effort has concentrated on the  
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investigation of alternative management procedures for the Cape hake resource off the 
west coast of South Africa (see Punt 1991).   
For management purposes ICSEAF divided the area under its management into 
Divisions.   Off South Africa Division 1.6 corresponds to the west coast, and Divisions 2.1 
and 2.2 correspond to the south coast (see Figure 1).  In all four ICSEAF Divisions, catch 
per unit effort (CPUE) figures indicate a steady decline up to the late 1970s, when catch 
rates reached their lowest recorded levels.  At that time a dynamic production model was 
introduced for managing the resource using CPUE data (Andrew and Butterworth 1987).  
Although a global TAC is set for management purposes, the hake resource off 
South Africa has been divided into two stocks, and scientific TAC's are formulated for 
each stock, under the assumption that the stocks of hake off the south and west coasts are 
biologically isolated (Payne and Punt 1992).  However Payne et al. (1987) suggests that 
there may be some interaction between the M. paradoxus stocks on the south and west 
coasts.  Current scientific TAC recommendations for the South African hake fishery are 
based on a dynamic production model estimation procedure which utilizes catch, CPUE 
and survey biomass data (see Punt 1988, 1992).  
 
2.2  The long-line versus trawl debate  
Successful trials on the capture of hake by longlines in 1983 led to a rush for concessions 
(42 in one year).  The method resulted in high catch rates, was selective and could be 
employed on a rough substrate (Stander 1995).  Realizing the potential of this new fishery, 
the authorities in May 1983 prohibited the capture of hake using the longline method 
(Stander 1995).  During 1983 six experimental permits for longlining were issued (for 1500 t 
of hake) and despite the high catch of kingklip and the warnings from the Sea Fisheries 
Research Institute (SFRI, now Marine and Coastal Management), the authorities issued a 
further six permits to non-hake quota-holders in 1985.  The longline operations were to 
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target hake, however Kingklip (the bycatch of the longline permits), were immediately 
targeted as the species of preference as they were worth four times the value of hake.  
Prices for landed kingklip were in the region of R8/kg in 1985.  
By 1986 longline catches reached a peak of 10364 tons of which hake constituted 
a mere 16 per cent, the rest comprising mostly of kingklip (Stander 1995).  From 1986 to 1990 
the Minister, the Fisheries Advisory Council and Sea Fisheries attempted to formulate 
measures to satisfy conflicting interests.  However by March 1990 it was clear that the 
kingklip resource was severely overfished.  In June 1990 the Minister announced an end to 
all longlining.  The six non-quota-holders were compensated by means of a hake quota of 
240 tons each and have since regrouped into four companies (Stander 1995).  
In 1993 a cooperative Longline Experiment was set up.  The longline experiment 
involved a joint strategy between tuna and squid fishers (who were longlining), the 
established industry and government in order to evaluate the bio-economic value of 
longlining (Anon. 1995, Badenhorst 1995).  The parties involved in the experiment were 
brought together in workshops to evaluate alternative strategies for data collection (see 
Fowkes and Sowman 1994).  It is often suggested that longlining is potentially detrimental 
to the established trawl based industry as they target larger fish and thus threaten the large 
fecund females, reducing the spawning stock biomass (SSB) and thus threatening the long-
term productivity of the stock (Anon. 1992, 1993).  On the other hand the longline sector 
question the biological rationale for being precautionary with longlining even though 
kingklip were overfished as the trawl fleet target immature fish (65 per cent of the fish 
landed are less that 0.8kg).  Preliminary assessments on both coasts, the west coast and 
south coast (Butterworth et al. 1992, Geromont et al. 1995, 1995b) indicate that a higher 
yield-per-recruit can be obtained by using longlines.  These assessments were based on 
extensive research undertaken by Armstrong and Japp (1992) and Japp (1993, 1995a-e, 
1996).  
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Figure 3 The hake CPUE from 1955 to 1997 in ICSEAF division 1.6 (see Figure 1, data from 
Leslie 1998; after the CPUE was standardized using a General Linear Model (GLM) 
































The original trawl CPUE trend (i.e. before the application of a General Linear 
Model (GLM)) showed a 3 per cent increase over the last few years and this was thought 
to be due to the conservative policy of the  f0.1 and  f0.2 fishing strategies.  After 
standardizing the relationship with the GLM by taking into account changes in power 
factors, the revised trawl CPUE over the last few years shows no significant change for the 
years (1972-1998, p=0.337)(Figure 3).  Under a revised Operational Management Procedure 
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3.  METHODS 
The surplus production model and ad hoc tuned VPA assessment methods currently used 
to provide the basis for scientific TAC recommendations for the Cape hake resource off 
South Africa provide rather different appraisals of the current status and productivity of 
this resource.  These two methods are based on certain assumptions regarding recruitment, 
natural mortality and fishing selectivity.  In this analysis the approach is to introduce the 
application of an age-structured model, which when using CPUE data provides similar 
results to the production model and the VPA assessments depending on alternative 
assumptions regarding the selectivity of gear. 
 
3.1  Age-structured models and yield simulation  
An age-structured model is an assessment technique which can take account of the age-
structured nature of fish populations, but does not necessarily require estimates of the 
age-composition of the catches (although the option to incorporate catch-at-age data 
exists) (Hilborn 1990, Punt 1993).  The model can be formulated such that it is able to 
predict changes in population size and yield under different patterns of selectivity.  This 
approach involves constructing a deterministic age-structured population model which 
assumes that recruitment is deterministically related to spawner stock biomass (SSB).  
These age-structured models include numbers of individuals at each age, a ge-specific 
mass, age-specific fishing selectivity, as well as natural mortality rates and stock-
recruitment parameters and yield.  Generally age-structured models can be written in a 
variety of different ways.  The choices that must be made are whether the fishing and 
natural mortalities are assumed to be continuous processes acting simultaneously, or 
separate discrete time events.  The model used here is a discrete time model based on 
Hilborn (1990). The general age-structured model can be written simply as: 
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Ny+1,a+1 = Ny,a e - ( Ma + Sa Fy )        (E.1) 
where   
Ny,a   is the number of fish of age a at the start of year y, 
Ma  is the rate of natural mortality on the fish of age class a, 
Sa   is the selectivity of the fishery on fish aged a years (0< Sa <1), 
Fy    is the fishing mortality for fully vulnerable individuals in year y,  i.e. fish with  
  Sa = 1 (the year effect for the fishing mortality).  
To take age effects into account fishing mortality-at-age (Fy,a) is separated into 
an age-component which is common to all years (age-specific selectivity - Sa) and a year-
component which is common to all ages within a particular year (year effect of fishing 
mortality - Fy).  This assumption is justifiable if the distribution of fish and fishing vessels 
does not vary s ubstantially from one year to the next.  Two scenarios in which the 
separability assumption would not be justified, and which might be pertinent to any fishery 
(Punt 1991). The separability assumption is based on the following relationship: 
Fy,a  = Fy Sa              (E.2) 
where  
Fy,a  is the instantaneous rate of fishing mortality on fish aged a during year 
y,  
The spawning stock biomass SBBy can be calculated as: 




Ny,a Wa       
  (E.3) 
where   
SSBy   is the spawning biomass at the beginning of the year y, 
Wa  is the mass-at-age for a fish 
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m  is the age at sexual maturity (assumed to be 5 years)  
It is assumed further that there is a relationship between the spawning biomass 
SSBy in one year, and the average recruitment in the following year (Beverton and Holt 
1957): 
Ny+1,1 = (? SSBy) / (SSBy+?? )         (E.4) 
where     
?, ?   are the stock-recruitment relationship parameters. 
Equations (E.1) - (E.4) define the dynamics of both numbers-at-age and biomass-
at-age.  It is possible to relate the model to observed data, however additional relationships 
need to be defined.  It is assumed that the available indices of population abundance are 
proportional to stock biomass (where the abundance index is either CPUE or survey 
biomass).  For the age-structured population model the equation for model-predicted catch 
(or sustainable yield if F is held constant) is: 




Wa- Sa Fy  Ny,a (1- e - ( Ma + Sa Fy )
)/(Ma +Sa Fy) (E.5) 
3.1a  Life-history data utilized 
Annual recorded trawl catch and trawl CPUE data for the South African west 
coast hake stock are shown in Figure 2 and Figure 3 respectively.  The estimated total 
annual landed hake catch from the west coast is available (that is published) for the period 
1917 to 1996 and landed catch by fishing method for 1983 to 1996 (Leslie 1998).  Cape hakes 
consist of two morphologically similar hake species,  Merluccius capensis and M. 
paradoxus (Van Eck 1969).  Since it is not easy to distinguish visually between the two 
species only the total combined species catch is recorded thus the model is not single-
species.  Although Cape hake in Division 1.6 have been fished since the turn of the 
century, comprehensive trawl CPUE are only available from 1955.  The catch statistics are  
No 1, 2002    
 
15
usually reported in tonnes landed weight.  Fish are headed and gutted before being 
weighed and therefore catch figures were converted to tonnes whole (nominal) weight by 
multiplying by a factor of 1.46 (Chalmers 1976).  Nominal catches prior to 1972 were 
increased by 39 per cent to account for discarding of small hake (Andrew 1986).  The 
collection of otoliths for ageing purposes and catch-length frequency data permits the 
breakdown of the total catch-by-mass into catch-at-age estimates.  Length frequency data 
also exist for the years 1964 to 1977 for the west coast.  In principle these data can be used 
to estimate catch-at-age for these years.  
Although survey biomass data are available from 1983, they are not utilized here.  
Punt (1993) incorporated survey biomass data in his age-structured production model 
assessments and found in his sensitivity tests that the results scarcely changed when 
survey biomass data were not taken into account.  Andrew et al. (1989) incorporated 
biomass survey data into their assessment and found that fits to the relative indices of 
survey biomass and CPUE data hardly changed from fits to the CPUE data alone.  
Although the biomass estimates have fluctuated over the period since 1983, they show no 
significant trend. 
 
3.1.2  Estimation of parameters 
3.1.2.1  Input parameters 
Four age-specific parameters are needed before the population can be simulated. These 
include selectivity-at-age (Sa), mass-at-age (Wa), and mortality-at-age (Ma).  The 
remaining parameter is age-at-maturity.  The estimates of selectivity-at-age, mass-at-age 
and age-at-maturity were obtained from other sources.  The parameter values  for the 
logistic selectivity function are based on the analysis of selectivity-at-age conducted by 
Punt (1991).  The values for the parameters related to growth and maturation were taken 
from Punt and Leslie (1991).  The natural mortality-at-age was assumed to be constant over 
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the age classes considered.  There are rarely any data to justify the assumption that 
mortality is age-specific and it is normally assumed to be the same regardless of age.  In 
must be borne in mind that the hake size mix in the population is dynamic and affected by 
the survival of the different age classes.  As Botha (1980) pointed out enhanced survival of 
both species to a large size will increase the rate of cannibalism on younger age classes.   
However increased fishing pressure on large hake will correspondingly increase the 
survival of younger age classes.  Therefore it would be important to consider the effects of 
cannibalism on the age-specific mortality as well, however the paucity of data precludes 
such a study. 
 
3.1.2.2  Selectivity-at-age 
The selectivity function used in the "base case" model is a logistic curve which is assumed 
to be time invariant.  The paucity of data on the selectivity of trawl gear changes over time 
preclude estimation of the extra parameters that would be required to reflect changes over 
time.  The model used is:  
Sa = 1/(1+ e  ((-a - Ac)/? ))          (E.6)  
 
where      
Sa  is the selectivity of the trawl gear on fish of age a, 
Ac  is the age-at-50%-selectivity, 
?   is a "steepness" parameter for the selectivity curve. 
 
The values Ac = 2yr and ?? = 0.5 yr-1 used for the model are based on an analysis 
by Punt (1991).  However to investigate the effect of decreasing selectivity-at-age for older 
fish the following selectivity function was used: 
Sa = 1/(1+ e  ((-a - Ac)/? ))  for a<am     (E.7)    
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Sa =  e  (- ? (a-am))    for a>or = am       (E.8) 
where       
am  is the age at which selectivity reaches its maximum value  – after this age 
selectivity-at-age decreases and, 
??   is the exponentially decreasing selectivity coefficient at older ages.  
The values for the parameters ??and am were chosen to be 0.1 and 5yr, respectively (Figure 
4) for hake targeted by trawlers. 
 
Figure 4 Selectivity versus age relationship for the trawl gear showing the effect of 

































The values Ac = 5yr and d = 0.5 yr-1 were used for the longline selectivity function 
(same as E.7) in the model.  These parameters were estimated from the catch-at-age data for 
longline caught hake on the west coast for 1994-1996 (Leslie 1998). 
 
3.1.2.3  Mass-at-age 
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Growth parameters were obtained from Punt and Leslie (1991).  The length-weight 
relationship was obtained from Punt and Leslie (1991).  The relationship between mass and 
age is calculated from the following function: 
Wa  =  A (Ly(1-e  - KP(a - TN))) b        (E.9) 
(that is a Von Bertalanffy age-length relationship imbedded in a standard mass-length 
relationship)  
where    
Wa  is the mass-at-age for a fish aged exactly a-1,  
Ly  is the asymptotic length of fish in cm, 
KP  is the rate at which length approaches Ly - the growth rate parameter and,   
TN  is the age at zero growth and, 
A = 0.0055, Ly = 230.3, b = 3.084, KP = 0.046, TN = -0.825  
 
The values for the parameters related to growth and mass-at-length were selected 
on the basis of the results of Punt and Leslie (1991).  Punt and Leslie (1991) found that the 
difference between the two species for both maturation and growth is not particularly 
marked and that it is justifiable to use one set of growth/maturity parameter values when 
performing assessments.   
     
3.1.2.4  Mortality-at-age 
For most estimation procedures mortality is assumed to be constant, either M= 0.3 yr-1 or 
M= 0.5yr-1.  In order to be consistent with previous assessments of the resource (for 
example Andrew 1986), a value of M= 0.3 yr-1 was chosen for the assessments.  
 
3.2.1  Parameters estimated by the model  
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The parameters which are obtained by fitting the model to the available data are the 
catchability coefficient (q), the relationship between the biomass and index of abundance 
(CPUE) and the two stock-recruitment parameters a  and b.  The first step in the regression 
is to obtain a set of initial age-class numbers, Ny,1.  This is done by setting the initial age-
distribution equal to that of the deterministic unexploited equilibrium (denoted by *) level 
for the stock (i.e. the age-structure corresponding to Fy = 0, for y<1917, see Punt 1990), 
therefore: 















N*y,a Wa          (E.11) 
where    
N*y,a   is the equilibrium number of fish of age a at the start of year y 
R*1   is the average equilibrium recruitment 
SB*1   is the spawning biomass at equilibrium.   
 
By substituting equation (E.10) into equation (E.11) it is possible to obtain a 
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          (E.13) 
gives                 
R*1 = SB*1/ g              (E.14) 
 
For the Ricker stock-recruitment relationship: 
 
R*1 = a SB*y e  - b SB*y           (E.15) 
Equations (E.14) and (E.15) can be solved for the average equilibrium recruitment 
(R*1) and the equilibrium spawning biomass (SB*1).  The result is: 
R*1 = ln (a g )/(b g )            (E.16) 
A similar derivation can be done for the Beverton-Holt stock-recruitment (see 
Figure 5).  Relationship giving the following relationship for the average equilibrium 
recruitment (R*1) level: 
R*1 = =  (a g -b)/(g)            (E.17) 
Figure 5 A typical fit of the Beverton-Holt stock recruitment relationship to the observed 
data.  
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Equation (E.16) and (E.17) can be substituted into equation (E.10) to compute the 
initial conditions for both stock-recruitment relationships: 









          (E.18) 
 
The assumption that the hake stock was at equilibrium at its carrying capacity at 
the start of 1917 would seem to be realistic, because catches prior to 1917 were negligible. 
 
3.1c  The regression approach 
Once the input parameters and the necessary starting conditions specified, an exploitable 
biomass sequence can be calculated and compared to the observed index of exploitable 
biomass ( i.e. CPUE).  The simulated and observed indices of abundance (CPUE) are 
incorporated into an objective function of the form: 
 








 [ln (q BEy) - ln (Cy / Ey)]2       (E.19) 
 
The use off logarithms in the objective function is based on the assumption that 
the dominant noise in the model is in term Cy / Ey, that is the choice of the error in the 
model is "observational error", and that this noise may arise from catchability fluctuations.  
Changing environmental factors, seasonal migration and behavioral/distributional changes 
tend to produce inter-annual catchability fluctuations.  One would expect catchability to be 
influenced by a large number of these factors, each of which may well be independent and 
have a multiplicative effect.  The central limit theorem implies that the sum of the logarithms 
of the magnitudes of these factors approaches a normal distribution, and therefore taking 
logarithms is the most appropriate transformation to use in the objective function. 
The minimization procedure AMOEBA (Numerical Methods, Cambridge 1988) was 
used to find the parameter values which would provide the best fit.  In order to be 
consistent with previous applications (Hutton 1992) of this method the Beverton-Holt form 
of the stock-recruitment relationship was used.  In the model, q and the parameters of the 
stock-recruitment relationship (a and b for the Beverton-Holt relationship) were estimated. 
 
3.2  The bio-economic model 
3.2.1  Calculating the NPV 
Those in decision-making positions often require that analyses are translated directly into 
economic values.  Estimates of yield are obtained from the biological model.  Prices and 
costs per unit weight of fish landed are applied to the estimates of yield in order to obtain 
profit (rent) under alternative scenarios.  The total long term benefits (that is, the sum of  
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predicted rent per year over the time horizon of the analysis) under alternative scenarios of 
resource exploitation can be calculated by computing the Net Present Value (NPV) of the 
stream of benefits over time.  This would provide as with the equivalent of a monetary flow 
account as here we assume that cost is the sum of all the costs to the producer (for example 
intermediate consumption, compensation to employees, depreciation of capital, return on 
investment).  The NPV depends on the discount rate (d), which captures both society’s 
time preference for consumption and the opportunity cost of capital.  Total discounted net 
present value (NPV, that is the long term benefits) can be calculated over a set period of 
time, t=1..T, where T=30 is the terminal year of the analysis): 
where: 
d  = discount rate 
t   = time 
P  = landing price per ton for each sector  
Yt  = total yield (tons) landed at time t, 
C  = cost per ton for gear for each sector 
 
The discount rate used in this study is d=0.1 (10 per cent) which is high on a 
global scale.  However it is satisfactory for this study because in South Africa the inflation 
rate on basic food items is in the region of 10 per cent and the prime interest rate on money 
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discount rate used in this study.  This is in agreement with the 10 per cent discount rate 
used by the World Bank for  evaluating the cost and benefits of projects located in 
developing countries.  
 
3.2.2  A brief review of the literature 
Much of the literature focussing on fisheries bio-economic models are analytical in which 
equilibrium solutions are determined and discussed.  Many solutions of dynamic bio-
economic models have been presented in the literature (see Clark 1990, Clark and Munro 
1982, 1994, Munro 1 981, 1992, 1998, Munro and Scott 1985).  These studies present  
dynamic optimization problems of the type given in equation E.20 constrained by the 
biological model of the resource stock.  The results of these studies confirm what has 
become known as the ‘modified Golden Rule’ of resource or capital accumulation, as it 
provides a rule for determining the extent to which society should invest in a resource. 
Usually the optimal  biomass lies between the biomass at bionomic equilibrium (no rent 
generated) and the biomass at maximum sustainable yield.  The path taken to the optimal 
solution is complex (see Clark et al. 1979).  The policy implications of the modified Golden 
Rule are such that it is only rational for a participant in a fishery to invest in the future if the 
benefits of the investment accrue to them.  Also the gains they make should at least equal 
the gains from alternative investments.  It is difficult to include age of fish in these 
analytical models thus the approach taken here is to use a simulation model, which is 
forward projecting2.  
 
3.2.3  Economic data utilized 
                                                 
2 Saville (1997) considered the west and south coast hake fisheries, but could not include 
both the trawl and the longline sectors as the form of his model was not age-structured.  
No 1, 2002    
 
25
Obtaining cost data and particularly the short run cost data (marginal and average) can be 
problematic.  In South Africa it is difficult to obtain cost relationships considering the 
paucity of information from the demersal trawl sector, since the various companies make 
every effort to remain competitive.  Companies do not readily publish their cost information 
(Saville 1997).  It is easier to obtain cost data from the longline sector as they have made 
numerous submissions to the government requesting larger quota shares based on 
economic factors.  In practice it is possible to present short-run cost data as the fixed costs 
plus variable costs of vessels and obtain short-run fleet cost data by aggregating short-run 
vessel cost data (see Doll 1988). Based on the latter method, Sumaila (1995) presents a cost 
function for each vessel, which even though for most practical purposes is linear in effort 
includes a parameter (b=0.01).  The introduction of this parameter in the cost function 
ensures strict concavity of individual profits as a function of individual effort. However in 
fisheries models a special case exists as the long run fleet cost data is required for 
simulations of alternative harvest strategies (Doll 1988).  
One of the first attempts, to obtain reliable economic data for both the longline 
and trawl sector, was made during the Longline Experiment which began in 1993, when 
3000t were allocated to the longliners.  Data were collected in 1995, 1996 and 1997 (that is 
three consecutive years).  
The economic data from the Longline Experiment consisted of:  
•  Sales price per kilogram hake caught; 
•  Landing cost per kilogram hake caught; 
•  Total cost per kilogram hake caught; 
•  Net income before interest and tax per kilogram hake caught; 
•  Return before interest & taxation on capital investment. 
However the reliability of the data collected during the Longline Experiment (see 
Anon 1998) can be questioned because of the high confidence intervals.  At that time  
 




(average data for 1995-1997), the cost for landing a kilogram of hake by the longline fleet 
was R5.75 and the cost for landing a kg. of hake by the trawl fleet was R5.00 (Anon 1998).   
The average price paid for longline landings was R8.50 R/kg and the price paid for trawl 
landings was R6.75 R/kg (Anon 1998).  
 
Short-run cost data 
The assumption that short-run marginal cost is equal to the average cost for longlining is 
based on the data presented in Figure 6.  Figure 6 shows short-run unit cost versus 
production for one of the most efficient fishing firms operating longline vessels in 1999. 
The slope of the unit cost versus production relationship (in Figure 6) shows no significant 
change (p=0.12) indicating that for our purposes it can be assumed that marginal cost is 
equal to average cost.  As with Saville (1997) we had to assume that the same relationship 
holds for trawling in the short-run.  
 
Figure 6 The relationship between unit cost and production (tonnes landed) for a fishing 
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Obtaining data from the trawl sector is always problematic because of the 
extremely low level of disclosure by the industry.  However we were provided with an  
 
estimate for the cost of fishing effort from the industry (from one the  two largest 
companies) for 2000.  It costs on average R30000 for a std boat day of trawl fishing effort. 
We can use this estimate to obtain total cost versus exerted fishing effort for a range of 
trawl fishing effort levels (Figure 7), however  this computed relationship is more 
appropriate for the analysis of the long-run cost data as it provides us with an estimate of 
total cost over a wide range of effort levels. A wide range of effort levels would only be 
observed over the long-run in a fishery. 
 
Figure 7 The relationship between cost and trawl fishing effort based on the assumption 
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Long-run cost data 
As already stated, in fisheries models, it is important to apply long run fleet cost data (Doll 
1988).  We are in effect considering potentially very large wide-ranging changes in effort 
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between the two sectors over a considerable time (we calculate the NPV over a 30 year 
period), when we simulate the effects of alternative harvest strategies.  Therefore we need a 
relationship between cost and fishing effort in t/std day as input into the model for the long  
 
run (for each sector that is trawl and longline)(or cost versus fishing mortality as we have 
estimated the catchability coefficient).  We believe it is reasonable to assume that in the 
long run, the unit cost for both sectors is going to increase for very high effort levels (or 
fishing mortality rates) as CPUE decreases and vice versa.  The trawl cost data we used are 
based on that presented in RAU (2000), where the average landed unit cost for trawling is 
R5.00/kg of hake landed (for 2000).  For longlining we use a value of R5.00/kg of hake 
landed as the unit cost.  We assume the unit cost presented in Figure 6 is an under-
estimate for 2000 (at R4 per kg landed), as it is data collected from what is claimed to be the 
most efficient longline fishing firm.  In addition the data presented in Figure 6 reflects the 
situation in 1999 and with the high rate of inflation it is reasonable to assume that in 2000 
the value is greater.  
The most important part of this exercise is then to equate this cost data to the 
current effort levels for each sector and then make some assumptions about long-run cost 
versus fishing effort (we assume it is linear).  For example the current fishing effort levels in 
the trawl fleet are such that Fy3 = 0.3 year
-1 (and at this level, cost = R5/kg of hake landed).  
Therefore if we assume that cost is equal to zero when there is no fishing (that is effort 
equals zero), we can obtain a linear relationship between these two effort levels such that: 
Trawl cost (per kg landed) = 16.667 Fy(trawl)     (E.21) 
                                                 
3 See Equation  E.2 for a definition of Fy.  
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Note that in this case we relate cost to fishing mortality, but as stated before 
fishing mortality is correlated with fishing effort if we assume q is constant.  Furthermore 
for longlining the same exercise can be carried out.  The current fishing effort levels are 
such that Fy = 0.05 year
-1 for longline caught hake (and cost is equal to R5/kg of hake  
 
landed).  Thus using the same arguments as presented above we obtain a relationship such 
that: 
Longline cost (per kg landed) = 100 Fy(longline)     (E.22) 
This does not directly imply that the cost of longlining is greater than trawling as 
Fy (trawl) is not equal to Fy (longline), because of the large difference in the selectivity of 
the gear.  In fact, with the same Fy the trawl fleet lands more hake.  Hence the cost of 
fishing effort in the longline fleet is less than fishing effort in the trawl fleet for the same Fy, 
remembering that the relationship between Fy and fishing effort for each fleet is not the 
same.  
The final process in this procedure is to verify whether the above assumptions 
and parameter estimates provide us with the long-run fleet cost data, that is, total cost 
versus fishing effort.  The total cost versus fishing effort is computed by multiplying the 
unit cost at a particular level of Fy by the yield obtainable at Fy (in this case for the trawl 
fleet).  
Since, we assume q is constant and fishing effort is equal to Fy/q, we can plot the resultant 
total cost versus trawl effort (a function which is a by-product of the parameter estimates, 
the various stated assumptions and the dynamics of the model).  The relationship is shown 
in Figure 8.  It is reassuring to note that the relationship in Figure 8 (especially the fitted 
curve to values of effort < 15000  std boat days) approximates the other method of 
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estimating the total cost versus trawl fishing effort shown in Figure 7 which was obtained 
from the industry4.  
Remember:  the method used to obtain the relationship in Figure 8 relied on 
obtaining an estimate of unit cost and equating this value to current effort levels, 
formulating from this equation (E.21) and then multiplying the unit cost at a particular level 
of effort by the yield obtainable at this effort level.  Whereas the function represented in 
Figure 7 is based on an estimate obtained from the industry, where they estimate that it 
costs on average R30000 for a std boat day of trawl fishing effort  
Figure 8 The relationship between total cost and fishing effort for the trawl fleet. The solid 
line is obtained from a fit to lower effort levels. At higher effort levels total cost 
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4 The functions in Figure 7 and Figure 8 have approximately the same slope and intercept. 
The differences are small considering the fact that these are estimates of aggregated data 
for a whole fleet.  
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It is pertinent to observe that for high effort levels (> 15000t per std boat day), 
which are not sustainable in the long term, the total cost values are lower than the assumed 
linear relationship which exists at low effort levels (< 15000 std boat days)(Figure 8).  The 
reason is because at high effort levels the stock is being over-exploited at non-sustainable 
levels and yield is decreasing.  A similar relationship between total cost and effort is 
assumed to exist for the longline fleet in our model as we have made similar assumptions 




Constant year 2000 prices were assumed when we project forward and calculate the NPV. 
The price data for each sector were obtained from RAU (2000).  The price paid for trawl 
caught hake is R10/kg (wholesale). For longline caught hake the price is R30/kg (wholesale) 
when the market (in Spain) is not affected by imports of hake from other regions like South 
America.  For example in July 2000 the price fell to very low levels and at one stage it was 
not worth exporting longline caught hake (that is for export hake the price was R0/kg). 
Therefore, in this model we use a price of R15/kg for  longline hake, as this  price 
approximates the R14/kg estimate for average landed price in South Africa (RAU 2000). 
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4. PREDICTING GAME THEORETIC OUTCOMES 
 
Game theoretic modelling allows for the analysis of strategic interaction between agents 
(Osborne and Ruberstein 1994).  As more than one agent typically has property rights to 
fisheries, game theoretic-modelling has been used to  study non-cooperative and co-
operative outcomes between agents within alternative fisheries management systems and 
property rights regimes (Ostrom et al. 1997).  A review of game-theoretic models of fishing 
has been undertaken by Sumaila (1999) who notes that only a few attempts have been 
made to develop empirical game theoretic model of fisheries5. 
 
4.1  Using non-cooperative game theory 
In many fisheries specific rules for allocation of the TAC do not exist for scarce resources, 
thus fishing units compete for access.  The outcome of this competition is often negative 
leading to overfishing, overcapitalization, rent dissipation and conflict between interest 
groups, whose objective is to maximize own private benefits without due regard to the 
consequences of their actions on the payoffs of other players.  Non-cooperative game 
theory (Nash 1951) allows us to consider the equilibrium outcomes of this competition.  
Cooperative strategies are used interchangeably with co-operative management 
throughout this paper.  This is realistic considering that co-operative management is only 
possible if participants are willing to engage in binding agreements implying they will 
behave in a cooperative fashion.  Fishers will not enter agreements or obey regulations if 
the benefits of non-cooperation they receive are much greater than benefits of cooperation. 
                                                 
5 Game theory has been applied to virtually all areas of economics and there is an increase 
in the number of studies (see references in Sumaila 1999). The contributions in Weintraub 
(1992) consider the history of game theory based on the classic work of von Neumann and 
Morgenstern (1944).  
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The aim of this study is to isolate the negative effects of non-cooperative strategies.  This 
follows from the argument presented by Nash (1951, page 295):  "The writer has developed 
a dynamical approach to the study of co-operative games based upon a reduction to non-
cooperative form".  The approach is thus similar to that applied in Sumalia (1995)6.  
Thus the approach of this paper is to assume that binding agreements are not 
feasible at this stage7.  For example in South Africa various interests are in a real 
competitive situation for rights to the resource.  The aim is to isolate the negative effects of 
non-cooperation (for example biological) and evaluate whether there are economic 
incentives for non-cooperation or not.  This method is presented in Clark (1981, 1990) and 
for the sake of simplicity the computation is open-loop.  Clark's (1981) terminology of 
‘deplete = non-cooperative’ and ‘not-deplete = co-operative’ is used in this paper.  The 
loss in potential rent to the government needs to be quantified assuming the government 
does not facilitate binding agreements.  It is postulated that in this situation the 
government is not maximizing total benefits. 
Within a non-cooperative game theoretic modelling approach, as in Sumaila 
(1995), where he uses an algorithm to find a solution, the benefits to each player can be 
generated.  Under these conditions it is possible to compute the Nash equilibrium, which is 
the outcome when each player seeks to maximize on their private own payoffs, given the 
supposed actions of the others (Kreps 1990).  In this paper we consider the effects of non-
cooperative behaviour and therefore compute the difference in the outcomes between 
                                                 
6 Hart (1998) considers the characteristics required for fishers to cooperate in the south 
Devon inshore fishery after reflecting on the ‘Prisoner’s Dilemma’. (as named by Albert 
Tucker in an unpublished paper - see references in Rasmusen 1995).  
7 Thus the aim is not to apply a cooperative game theoretic analysis as in other studies 
which assume the establishment of binding agreements is feasible (see Amstrong and 
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potential co-operative strategies and existing non-cooperative strategies (defined in each 
case depending on the status of the stock).  In this case the payoffs to each player, as well 
as the total payoffs, are revealed.  Thus it is possible to generate the total NPV of economic 
rent and estimate the maximum value (graphically in this case as the model is not of an 
analytical form as in Sumaila 1995).  
 
Figure 9 The theoretical outcomes of a two player model as described by Clark (1990 and 
presented in OECD 1997). In each of the four scenarios above, the predicted 
benefits to Player 1 appear in the top right-hand corner and the predicted benefits 
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In the theoretical model, the assumption is that  if the players in the game 
cooperate they will conserve and if they display non-cooperative behaviour they will 
follow a depletion strategy.  Thus Figure 9 is adapted from Clark (1990, presented in OECD 
1997).  It is simplified from Clark’s (1990, presented in OECD 1997) two strategies of 
“conserve” or “deplete”.  Furthermore based on Clark’s analysis, the OECD (1997) presents 
                                                                                                                           
Flaaten 1991, Kaitala and Munro 1993, Lewis and Cowens 1982, Munro 1979, 1987, 1990, 
1992, 1994, 1996, Sumaila 1997, Yeto et al. 1997).   
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two cases: (1) where the discount rate (d) is large and larger payoffs are obtained from 
depletion or not cooperating even if others do or (2) there is an incentive to cooperate and 
conserve (the discount rates are low and there are only a few players).  However if the 
number of players (N) is large then each one receives a payoff of H/d*N.  A “cheater” then 
receives a much larger share of B, than if he/she cooperates.  Thus there are huge 
incentives to cheat as the number of players becomes large.  
We assume that fishing companies that target hake will not enter agreements if 
the benefits of non cooperation to them are greater than the benefits to them from 
cooperation. The assumptions are that under the current re-structuring, the assumed non-
cooperative  
 
strategy by the trawl sector will be to maintain fishing effort at its current levels (F= 0.3 
year
-1), and the assumed cooperative strategy will be to reduce fishing effort (F = 0.2 year
-
1).  In 1998 after extensive negotiations the trawl sector accepted a reduction in their quota 
of 8000 t (which equates approximately to the latter effort reductions, that is F is reduced 
by 0.05 year
-1).  For the Longline sector the non-cooperative strategy will be to increase F 
beyond their current quota limits (for  example, F= 0.08 year
-1), whereas a cooperative 
strategy will be to maintain their effort at the level required to meet their current quota 
(which equates approximately to the longline sector effort being F = 0.05 year
-1).  It should 
be noted that over the last five years participants have made numerous requests for an 
increase in their share of the total TAC.  
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5.  RESULTS 
 5.1  Physical flow accounts: the biological model results 
An age-structured production model (observed CPUE data were fitted) was constructed to 
simulate changes in F for trawlers and longliners. The CPUE derived from the model versus 
observed CPUE is shown in Figure 10.  
 
Figure 10  The fitted age-structured model predicted catch-per-unit effort (solid 
line) to the CPUE data (u). The model is tuned to observed trawl catches 

































The estimates for MSY, BMSY and B(1996)/K and K (the pre-exploited biomass) are 
shown in Table 2.  In addition the values of the estimated parameters a, b and q are also 
shown in Table 2.  The estimates for MSY are lower than those obtained by Punt (1993) 
however his analysis was based on the CPUE trend before it was modified by the GLM.  
The estimates of the current status of the stock (i.e the current biomass as a proportion of 
the unexploited biomass, B(1997)/K) indicate that the stock is fully exploited as this 
proportion is approximately equal to 20 per cent.  
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Table 2  Estimates for MSY, B MSY and B(1997)/K and K (the pre-exploited 
biomass). The values of the estimated parameters a, b and q are also 
shown. Biomass units are in ‘000 tonnes. 
Parameter  Estimate 
MSY  105.65 
BMSY  1021.79 
B(1997)/K  0.2081 
K  1917.60 
a  1.34 x 10
9 
b  6.36 x 10
11 
q  1.11 x 10
-11 
 
The sustainable yield versus fishing mortality for the trawl fleet is shown in Figure 
11.  This is the relationship under the current effort levels being exerted by the longline 
fleet.  
 
Figure 11  The sustainable yield versus fishing mortality for the trawl fleet under 
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The results from the age-structured model (that is, the estimate of q) can be used 
to assess the status of the resource stock over the past decade.  The opening stock and 
closing stock biomass estimates are based on the reported CPUE values multiplied by the 
catchability coefficient (q);  a method suggested by the United Nations (1999) and when 
combined with reported catch data be used to produce a physical flow account (Table 3). 
Since the management of the stock has been based on a conservative rebuilding strategy 
we expect the other changes in volume to be positive in each year.  The other changes in 
volume values are positive for the years over the period 1989 to 1998, but they do vary 
considerably.  The variability can be explained by various factors including (1) 
measurement errors in catch or effort, (2) environmental conditions impacting on the 
natural mortality or growth rates and/or (3) weather conditions impacting on CPUE either 
because the fish behave differently or because the fishing fleets had to modify their tactics.  
Overall apart from the low value for the closing stock in 1998, the trend in the 
opening stock values shows a slight increase from 1989 to 1998, and this slight increase 
has resulted in the significant increase (29 per cent) in the catch over this time period for  
the trawl fleet.  The initiatives to rebuild the stock are reflected in this increased catch 
(trawlers). The low value for the closing stock in 1998 is based on the reported CPUE 
values in 1999, a year in which the catch rates were the lowest in 5 years as very strong 
south-easterlies were thought to have resulted in the hake moving off the bottom.  The 
fleet had to move to less favorable fishing areas (Rob Tilney, pers comm.).  Thus closing 
stock value may be under-estimated for 1998 as the fish were not available to the fishery.  
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Table 3  The physical flow account (all values in ‘000 tons) for the west coast Cape hake 
stocks over a ten year period (1989-1998). The catches are the reported landings 
whereas the opening stock and closing stock biomass estimates are based on the 
reported CPUE values multiplied by the catchability coefficient ( q); a method 
suggested by the UN (1999). Note that the estimates for the closing stock biomass 
are based on the reported CPUE for the next year. 
Table 3 also shows the  catch (longliners) which in comparison to  catch 
(trawlers) are much smaller in volume.  However the selectivity pattern of longliners is 
significantly different to those of trawlers and although the values are lower, the impact of 
longlining is completely different.  The value of the biological model used in this analysis is 
that because it is age-structured it can take explicit account of the differences in selectivity 
patterns between the gear, something which you can not do in a simple analysis such as 
that in Table 3.  This would provide another possible explanation for the observed 
variability in the  other changes in volume  values.  Although at the current levels of 
exploitation by longliners the analysis presented in Table 3 does generally suffice in terms 
of indicating the overall trend in exploitation and stock dynamics. 
 
Year  1989  1990  1991  1992  1993  1994  1995  1996  1997  1998 
Opening 
stock  338.04  352.34  391.91  390.64  346.98  342.38  312.26  353.62  354.13  415.40 
Catch 
(trawlers)  84.90  78.92  85.52  86.28  98.11  102.77  94.72  91.36  92.33  109.30 
Catch 




98.90  118.11  84.24  42.62  93.51  71.08  135.16  89.47  151.03  15.33 
Closing 
stock  352.34  391.91  390.64  346.98  342.38  312.26  353.62  354.13  415.40  322.21 
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5.2  Bio-economic simulations of the west coast hake stock 
The total benefits under different configurations of trawl and longline effort was computed 
(see Figure 12).  Figure 12 indicates that maximum benefits can be obtained if approximately 
15 to 17 per cent of the quota is allocated to longliners.  This equates to a TAC for trawl 
caught hake of about 72 000 tons and a TAC for longline caught hake of about 12 000 tons.  
It is important to note that the total allowable catch differs according to different 
configurations of trawl and longline effort as the two sectors have vastly different 
selectivity functions.  An increase in longline effort provides greater benefits, but only 
under conditions where trawl effort has been reduced (to a TAC of 72 000 tons which is a 
lower TAC than current catches). The long-term benefits to longliners decrease when high 
proportions are allocated to this sector (Figure 12) because the cost of effort at high effort 
levels decreases the profitability of the fleet.  
The results from our analysis indicate that the exploitation of the stock could 
generate a NPV of approximately R7 000 million over the next thirty years if we use cost and 
price data for the year 2000.  Strydom and Nieuwoudt (in press) calculated that an annual 
rent of R279 million is generated by the South African hake industry (at 1997 lease prices 
for quota).  Thus an annual rent of R184 million would be generated from the west coast 
(where two thirds of the TAC is harvested).  This computes to a NPV of R1 742 million 
(discounted annual rent estimate multiplied by thirty years), which is less than the R7 000 
million estimated in this study.  However if we re-do the analysis using price and cost data 
from 1996 we obtain a NPV of R2 000 million which is close to Strydom and Nieuwoudt’s (in 
press) value.  In addition Strydom and Nieuwoudt’s (in press) rent estimates are based on 
the lease price paid to paper quota holders and their values may actually underestimate the 
potential rent.   
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Figure 12  The relationship between total benefit (NPV - Rands millions), and 
benefit to the trawl sector and longline sector and the proportion of the 
quota allocated to the longline sector. The relationship is based on an 
increasing cost function relative to fishing effort. 
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The greatest benefits to the trawl sector can be obtained if there is a reduction in fishing 
effort (from F=0.3 to F=0.2 year
-1) under an assumed cooperative strategy (Figure 13).  A 
difference in profit of R1357 million can be obtained under cooperative strategies versus 
non-cooperative strategies (for the trawl sector).  Thus a cooperative management strategy 
still remains the best strategy as far as the trawl sector is concerned.  The greatest benefits 
(a difference of R50 million over 30 years) accrues to the longliners if they engage in a non-
cooperative strategy and increase F, however these benefits are only achieved if the trawl 
sector reduces effort (Figure 13).  This benefit may be explained as the cost of enforcement 
the government would have to incur if the policy goal is to maintain longliners at their 
current effort levels.  
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Figure 13  Benefits to the trawl sector and longline sector under different scenarios 
of non-cooperative and cooperative strategies for the West Coast Deep-
Sea Hake fishery. The CPUE (t/ std day) after a 30-year period are also 
shown for each scenario in order to indicate the status of the resource. 
 
Longliners 
Trawl = R3876 million 
Total = R4702 million 
(CPUE = 1.31) 
Longliners = R825 million 
Trawl = R3599 million 
Total = R4340 million 
(CPUE = 1.01) 
Longliners = R741 million 
Trawl = R4967 million 
Total = R6340 million 
(CPUE = 3.80) 
Longliners = R1372* million 
Trawl = R5233 
# 
 million 
Total = R6555 million 
(CPUE = 4.26) 




-  cooperative 
Trawlers 
Cooperative 
# - Greatest benefits to trawl sector if reduce F (from F=0.3 to F=0.2), reduce  
quota by 10 000tons. 
* Greatest benefits to longliners if they increase F, but benefits are only available if 
trawl sector reduces effort. 
The CPUE which is a reflection of stock status shows a slight decline in this scenario 
Assumptions 
Trawl sector non-cooperative strategy:   F= 0.3 
Trawl sector cooperativestrategy:  F = 0.2 
Longline sector non-cooperative strategy:  F= 0.8 
Longline sector cooperative strategy:  F = 0.05
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6.  DISCUSSION 
6.1  Trawling versus longlining 
Officially the Department (DEA&T) has attempted to contain the overall longline quota to a 
small percentage of the overall TAC, the main reasons being resource considerations 
(sustainability) and information concerns.  As the number of participants increase the less 
chance exists that the information being obtained from the fishery is reliable.  The 
Department is also aware of the market constraints. Marine and Coastal Management (ex-
SFRI) have attempted to place more attention on assessing the impact of longlining using 
age-structured models and establish a more effective monitoring and control system before 
the overall longline quota is increased further.  MCM also plans to continue to collect 
socio-economic information, thus the overall quota is constrained along the lines of the 
original experiment.  From the analysis, it appears that the Department is aware of the fact 
that longline effort can only be increased under a strategy where trawl effort is reduced.  
The fundamental question is what proportion of the overall hake deep-sea quota 
for area 1.6 (West Coast) should be allocated to the longliners?  The government declared 
in 1998 that the longline quota would be 4 400 tons.  There were 800 applicants for longline 
permits in 1998 and 1 200 in 1999.  At the beginning of 1999 the deep-sea fleet were fishing 
against 40 per cent of their quotas, and a judicial review was underway in the High Court.  
Announcements in March 1999 indicated the reduction of the trawl quota would be 20 per 
cent, from 80 000 tons to 64 000 tons.  It was not clear whether the 14 000 tons difference 
will be trawled or longlined.  During May a decision was made to allocate 10000 t from the 
trawl sector to the Minister which would be given to previously disadvantaged and small 
and medium-sized enterprises, in most cases longliners.  
It appears that the government is hesitant to make decisions that will affect each 
sector as they are not able to fully compute the economic effects under different 
configurations of trawl and longline effort.  The results of the Longline experiment were 
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based on “what if”- scenarios, that is hypothetical changeovers entirely to longlining 
assuming the changeover could be completed in 1 year (that is trawling in 1996 to be 
followed by longlining in 1997), a very unlikely scenario (Anon. 1998).  During this period 
(only 1 year) trawling had profits of R752 million per annum with employment figures of 
7795 people whereas it was predicted that longlining would result in profits of R894 million 
per annum and employ 7 150 people (Anon. 1998).  These assessments only provide values 
for one year and are not based on a dynamic analysis.  In this paper the long term benefits 
are evaluated with a dynamic bio-economic model, which indicate that in the long term the 
greatest benefits can be obtained with a 15 to 17 per cent of the quota being allocated to 
longliners.  The current allocation to longliners under a conservative management policy is 
approximately 10 per cent depending on the number of longline permits issued.  This 
current allocation (10 per cent) is close to 15 to 17 per cent  allocation considering the 
uncertainties inherent in any analysis which relies in limited data.  The longline sector has 
only had an impact on the stock over the last 7 years.  There is considerable uncertainty as 
to whether the model parameters can provide good estimates of the effects of the longline 
sector from the trend in the trawl CPUE data.  This weakness in the assessment is due to 
the sector only becoming significant at a very late stage in the fishery rather than on the 
techniques used in this assessment.  The benefits of a further 5 to 7 per cent increase in the 
allocation to the longline sector may not justify the risk, as the benefits only reflect a 8 per 
cent increase in the NPV.  
 
6.2  Non-cooperative versus cooperative management 
The central government is responsible for the management of South Africa’s shared 
stocks and makes collective choice rules on behalf of license holders who act in their own 
interests.  The objective of this paper was to include economic factors and consider the 
effects of the alternative management strategies for two competing sectors (longline  
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versus trawl).  Game theoretic modeling was used to evaluate outcomes of assumed non-
cooperative versus cooperative management.  The results show that the greatest benefits 
to  
the trawl sector occur if they reduce F under a cooperative strategy.  An amount of R1 357 
million is obtained if the trawl sector follows a cooperative strategy in the future (over the 
next thirty years) and this strategy is not qualitatively sensitive to the discount rate. 
However as the discount rate increases the benefits decrease quantitatively.  In any event 
a cooperative management strategy still remains the best strategy as far as the trawl sector 
is concerned.  The extensive government-industry (the trawl sector) commitments to 
rebuilding has reversed the declining trends in CPUE observed in the 1960s and 1970s, and 
it is beneficial as far as the trawl sector are concerned for them to engage in cooperative 
strategies.  
The government is redistributing quota to new entrants and previously 
disadvantaged South Africans, resulting in competition between the established demersal 
trawl fleet and a new longline sector for access rights.  The greatest benefits (R50 million 
over thirty years) accrues to the longliners if they engage in a non-cooperative strategy 
and increase F, however these benefits are only achieved if the trawl sector reduces effort 
(Figure 13).  This benefit will be felt as the cost of enforcement the government would have 
to spend if they wish to maintain longliners at their current effort levels.  The current re-
structuring and institutional changes are thus impacting on the extensive interaction that 
existed in the past between the industry and the government.  The challenge in the future 
is for the government to engage in co-management arrangements, which replicate the 
successful agreements of the past with all the stakeholders;  that is, both the established 
industry and the new participants despite the fact that if new participants are longlining it 
is beneficial for them to engage in non-cooperative strategies. 
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